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Abstract With the introduction of the Water Framework Directive in 2001, EC wa-
ter law adopted both a governance approach and a river basin approach. These new
approaches are characterised by a high level of proceduralisation and by dividing
the EU territory into river basins. These characteristics emphasise the need for trans-
boundary cooperation in water management, both on the international and the re-
gional level. Although there is a long tradition of transboundary cooperation on the
international level, this level has its difficulties and limits, which urges the need for
regional transboundary cooperation in river basin management. There are several in-
struments available to shape cooperation at the regional level, but there is still little
experience in cooperation between water management authorities at that level. Af-
ter describing current transitions in EC water law, we explore some instruments and
their possibilities for transboundary cooperation on both levels, with a slight tendency
toward the regional level.
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1 Introduction
European water law is in transition. It has developed from a highly differentiated field
of law into a more coherent and integral legal domain. The Water Framework Di-
rective (WFD)1 integrates some older water directives, which guarantees that the old
protection regime will be respected.2 This transition has also brought about some new
approaches in EC water law, like the river basin approach,3 following from the 1992
Helsinki Convention.4 The river basin approach is reflected both in the WFD and the
Floods Directive (FD),5 and is based on an integrated protection of river basins on a
national and transnational scale. Other new aspects are a stronger focus on ecology
and the sustainable use of water, prescribing an integrated protection of ecosystems
as a whole, more attention to the ecological protection of the aquatic environment, the
relationship with other policy fields like nature, product policy, agriculture, and even
spatial planning and a greater role for financial or economic instruments and pub-
lic participation. Finally, new European directives are an example of a governance
approach with a focus on proceduralisation, flexibility and policy discretion for the
Member States.
This new approach seems a big step forward in European water management, es-
pecially when it comes to new challenges in water management like the protection of
ecosystems, dealing with the effects of climate change and the transnational manage-
ment of European waters. However, it also becomes clear that some goals are diffi-
cult to achieve for individual Member States, when measures are necessary in policy
fields that are fully harmonised by the EC, or in the case of transboundary effects.
Especially the river basin approach leads to shared responsibilities between Member
States in one transboundary river basin. EC law lays down obligations for the Mem-
ber States individually, for directives are binding as to the results to be achieved by
each addressed Member State.6 This correlation between shared responsibilities and
individual obligations emphasizes the need for (more) structural transboundary coop-
1Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a
framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L327/1.
2The main purpose of the WFD, in short, is to establish a framework for the protection of inland surface
waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater (Article 1 WFD). The WFD stipulates envi-
ronmental objectives aimed at achieving a ‘good status’ of surface waters and groundwater (Article 4.1
WFD).
3A river basin is the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a series of streams, rivers
and, possibly, lakes into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta (Article 2.13 WFD).
4The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, done
at Helsinki on 17 March 1992. In force on 6 October 1996; 31 ILM 1312 (1992). The WFD is to contribute
to the implementation of Community obligations under international conventions on water protection and
management, notably the Helsinki Conference (Paragraph 35 Preamble WFD).
5Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the as-
sessment and management of flood risks, OJ L 288/27. The main purpose of the Floods Directive is to
establish a framework for the assessment and management of flood risks, aiming at the reduction of the
adverse consequences for human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity associ-
ated with floods in the Community.
6Article 249 EC Treaty.
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eration.7 EC water law contains a general obligation for Member States to cooperate
in Article 3.4 WFD.8 Still, EC water law does not prescribe any concrete instruments
to shape this cooperation. Neither does it contain any provisions to collectively hold
Member States responsible for achieving the results in an international river basin dis-
trict. Nor does it provide for exemptions if the results are not achieved by a Member
State because of certain acts or omissions by another (Member) State. This unfortu-
nately leads to the conclusion that EC water law nowadays does not itself provide for
a satisfactory solution to one of the major problems in European water management:
transboundary pollution and the transboundary effects of flood risk management.
To meet the objectives of modern EC water directives, Member States should co-
operate successfully, and they should initiate and eventually structure this cooperation
themselves. Possibilities for formal international or regional transboundary coopera-
tion do exist, but these are almost left unused, especially the possibilities for regional
transboundary cooperation. An important condition for successful cooperation is that
Member States should have the same points of departure, mainly concerning the way
in which to deal with complexity and policy discretion, as well as ambitions and the
legal value of obligations deriving from EC water law. Nowadays, many differences
still exist, which seems to be a suppressing factor for successful transboundary co-
operation in water management.9 Harmonization is one of the main objectives of EC
law and it is also necessary in EC water and environmental law.
We will explore two different levels of transboundary cooperation that can be used
to shape this cooperation: cooperation on a state or international level as well as co-
operation on a regional level.10 To meet the objectives of modern EC water directives,
cooperation should take place at both levels as it is a linear process that needs con-
tinuous interaction between all the parties involved across and within borders at all
relevant (administrative) levels. The first level is the international level, at which so-
called watercourse conventions have been or could be concluded. The accompanying
structures mostly stem from multilateral (or occasionally bilateral) conventions, and
are solely meant for cooperation between state actors. Within the Community, this
level is mostly suitable for inter alia coordinating the implementation of EC water
law, setting goals and standards, drafting and coordinating river basin management
plans, drafting and coordinating programmes of measures, and the use of exemptions
(if any are available).11 In general, at this high political level of transnational water
management, policy is mostly made, but few or no concrete measures are actually
taken.
The second level is the regional level. The accompanying structures mostly stem
from bilateral or trilateral conventions, secondary EC law, and other kinds of formal
and informal agreements and are meant for cooperation between regional authorities,
7See Keessen/Van Kempen/Van Rijswick [12].
8The obligation to cooperate is not new in EC water law. Before the WFD, a comparable obligation could
be found in, for example, Article 4 of the Swimming Water Directive (76/160/EEC).
9See Uitenboogaart/Van Kempen/Wiering/Van Rijswick [26].
10Extensively on transboundary cooperation on both levels Gilissen [6].
11But also problems and restrictions occur at this level (see Sect. 4.2).
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including water management authorities.12 This is mostly suitable for cooperation in
water management at a practical level, i.e. the final phase of taking concrete measures
and other management actions in transboundary water systems. A lack of cooperation
at this level might lead to the undesirable and uncertain situation where (high-level)
transboundary water management policy does exist, but might never be executed in
practice.
The structure of this article is as follows. The article deals with the question of the
role of transboundary cooperation in river basin management in the new era of EC
water legislation. After the introduction above, in Sect. 2 we will give three exam-
ples of cases within the river basins of the Rhine, the Meuse and the Danube, which
illustrate the need and the desire for transnational cooperation. Section 3 deals with
some main changes in the governance of EC water management. Proceduralisation,
the consequences of the chosen river basin management approach, and the differences
in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in several Member States
will be briefly discussed before we focus on several methods of transnational coop-
eration. Section 4 deals with cooperation on the international level and its difficulties
and limits. Section 5 discusses several possibilities for cooperation at the regional
level. The regional cooperation within the river basins of the Meuse and Rhine will
be taken as an example, more in particular the experiences in cooperation between
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Special attention will be given to the new
Regulation on European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, being a new and chal-
lenging instrument for transboundary water management. We will finish with some
concluding remarks on our research question.
2 Three examples of water management that are in need of transnational
cooperation
To give an idea of the problems that have to be tackled in daily life, we will give three
examples of cases that demonstrate the need for transnational cooperation.
2.1 The Dommel13
The Dommel is a small transnational river within the Meuse basin district and it
flows from Belgium (Flanders) towards the Netherlands. On both sides of the bor-
der there are zinc factories belonging to the same company. The directive concerning
integrated pollution prevention and control (IPPC directive) and the Dangerous sub-
stances directive14 regulate the factories and both directives15 have been transposed
12Of course, these conventions have been concluded by States, but their aim is mainly to create some
possibilities for transboundary cooperation between regional authorities.
13The case of the River Dommel is currently being researched by J.J.H. van Kempen, Ph.D. candidate at
Utrecht University, Centre for Environmental Law and Policy.
14See Directive 2006/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 on pol-
lution caused by certain dangerous substances discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community.
15See Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning
integrated pollution prevention and control.
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into the national laws of Flanders and the Netherlands. On the Dutch side of the bor-
der, the requirements in the environmental licence are much more stringent than on
the Belgian side. Both countries state that their environmental requirements are in
accordance with the IPPC directive, especially that the emission standards are based
on the best techniques available. There are discharges of wastewater with dangerous
substances from the Belgian factory into the River Dommel very near to the border.
The polluted surface water flows into the Netherlands where the regional water au-
thority has great problems in complying with environmental standards for surface
water due to these discharges. In the Netherlands it is the regional water authority
that is responsible for the integrated water management of regional waters and which
is responsible—according to the Dutch national legal system—for meeting the goals
of the Water Framework Directive. Cooperation using the Meuse Treaty is not the
best option, because the Treaty is mainly meant for cooperation between Member
States on a central level. For regional water management, cooperation on the basis of
treaties is less suitable. Cooperation within transnational regional and often smaller
waters requires other kinds of cooperation.
2.2 The Rába case16
The Rába case concerns the pollution of a transnational river in Austria and Hun-
gary, both EU Member States. The river is one of the most natural and free-flowing
rivers in Hungary providing habitat for various flora and fauna. Fisheries and eco-
tourism are important. The river is part of the Danube river basin. It is polluted by
substances which cause a layer of foam on the surface water. The substance that
causes the foam is naphthalene-sulphonate, a so-called surfactant. It is discharged
by Austrian tanneries. The substance is not regulated under EC environmental law
(Directive 2006/11/EC) because the substance is not on list I or II. The tanneries are
IPPC installations but in the BREF documents the surfactant is listed as a tanning
agent that can be used in a tannery and it is not listed as one that should be substi-
tuted. Nevertheless, it causes damage to the environment, mainly because it harms
algae and smaller animals in the food chain. Furthermore, the tourism sector suf-
fers damage caused by the pollution. There is good cooperation between Austria and
Hungary on this matter and the question has been discussed in the European Par-
liament. Unfortunately the Daughter Directive with environmental quality standards
for surface waters (2008/105/EC)—called the Lex Rába by the Hungarians, because
they hoped that this directive would regulate the problem—does not set quality stan-
dards for this substance. EC law could not offer a proper solution in this case, nor
could international law. Informal cooperation led to the solution where the Austrian
authorities prescribed extra filtering measures in the environmental licences for the
tanneries.
2.3 The Rhine
The third example concerns the protection of the Rhine River Basin District against
flooding. The Rhine is a vulnerable river catchment area in the case of climate change,
16We have used the information for this case as described in Wellman [29].
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for example due to winter precipitation, snowmelt from the Alps, the large discharges
into the Rhine, many people living in the surrounding area and industry which is
situated in the river basin district. There was severe flooding in 1993, 1995, 1999,
and 2007. Nine Member States as well as non-Member States cooperate to protect
the area from flooding. There is great dependence between measures taken upstream
and flooding downstream and between spatial planning/land use and flood mitigation
measurements like the Dutch ‘more room for the river’ programme and the build-
ing of dikes. There is close cooperation within the Rhine Convention and the Rhine
Committee and on an informal basis, partly financially supported by the EU.
3 EC water law in transition: the role of transboundary cooperation
The main purpose of the WFD, in short, is to establish a framework for the protection
of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater.17 The
WFD stipulates environmental objectives aimed at achieving a ‘good status’ of sur-
face waters and groundwater.18 The purpose of the Floods Directive is to establish a
framework for the assessment and management of flood risks, aiming at a reduction
of the adverse consequences for human health, the environment, cultural heritage and
economic activity associated with floods in the Community.19
The ‘good status’ of surface water has to be achieved by the Member States
through producing river basin management plans for each river basin district within
their territory. In order to achieve the objectives established under Article 4 WFD,
they are also obliged to establish a programme of measures for each river basin
district within their territory.20 The objectives of the Floods Directive have to be
achieved by the Member States in three successive steps, namely the undertaking of
preliminary flood risk assessments; the preparation of flood hazard maps and flood
risk maps; and in the end the establishment of flood risk management plans.21
The role of transnational cooperation will be of more significance due to the new
approach in European water management, as mentioned before. In this section we
will describe some aspects of this new approach.
3.1 Proceduralisation
It is stated in the legal literature that there is a greater focus on proceduralisation in
EC water law.22 This may be the result of a governance approach. That is certainly
the case with the Directive on the protection against flooding but one could see this
tendency also in the Water Framework Directive. Examples are the setting of (eco-
logical) goals, the planning system, the role of the Common Implementation Strategy
17Article 1 WFD.
18Article 4.1 WFD.
19Article 1 Floods Directive.
20Articles 13 and 11 WFD.
21Articles 4, 6 and 7 Floods Directive.
22See amongst others: Howarth [11]; Scott [21]; Lee [14], p. 163; Van Rijswick [28].
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and the impact of public participation in the goal setting and planning process. Proce-
duralisation leads to a less clear division of powers. The administration works closely
together with the national legislators and the role of the European Parliament thereby
diminishes.
It is also argued that this more procedural approach leads to the fact that the Water
Framework Directive now contains obligations of best efforts or obligations concern-
ing means to attain the environmental objectives contained in Article 4, instead of
obligations to attain specific results that follow from the older water directives.
How must we deal with this new approach from a legal point of view? Will the am-
bitious goals and objectives be attained? Will water management in Europe improve
and will we manage to have a sustainable use of our water resources? Will there be a
fair sharing of the profits and burdens throughout the whole river basins? What will
it mean if we agree to the statement that the WFD only requests the Member States
to follow the correct procedures, to take measures that are part of the programmes
of measures and to make a proper use of the exemptions by providing good justifi-
cations? It is stated by Krämer that this new approach of Framework Directives and
proceduralisation is a result of a stronger Anglo-American influence.23 A decision
that is taken in conformity with an agreed procedure should lead to a good decision:
if the procedure is good, the decision is also good. Will the Court of Justice only
look whether all the necessary steps in the prescribed procedure have been taken in
the right way? That is the way the Dutch Council of State looks at government deci-
sions when the authorities have a great deal of policy discretion. We are not yet fully
convinced that this new approach alone will lead to a better protection of water sys-
tems and that the goals of the new European water directives can be achieved. If we
look at the implementation process in, for example, the Netherlands and England and
Wales we see that right from the beginning all exemptions will be used.24 Achieving
the good status under the Water Framework Directive will be at the earliest in 2027.
What will it mean if all upstream states in a river basin decide the same? How can
downstream countries ever fulfil their obligations on time? And what instruments do
they have to request more measures upstream?
A procedural approach may be logical for water management on islands like the
United Kingdom. There are no transnational river basins and all the consequences
remain within the Member State. But even then there are interests of citizens and
nature that need to be protected. On the continent, with its transnational river basins,
using only a procedural approach may lead to an unfair balance of profits and bur-
dens within river basins. In our point of view an ultimate goal and environmental
objectives, further elaborated in quality standards by means of obligations to attain
specific results, will guarantee a better protection regime. The main reason is that
these norms and standards will be easier to enforce, both by the European Commis-
sion, the Member States, individuals and NGOs. We can see this better protection in
EC court cases, where environmental quality standards are regarded as obligations
of result, which individuals can rely upon.25 At this moment in time the use of pol-
23See Krämer [13].
24Uitenboogaart/Van Kempen/Wiering/Van Rijswick [26].
25Case C-237/07 Janecek [2008] ECR I-6221.
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icy discretion should stay within certain boundaries, which means that in the end the
use of policy discretion should not harm the achievement of the ultimate goals of a
directive.
Exemptions in a directive lead to the conclusion that the corresponding obligation
is an obligation of result.26 Otherwise the exemptions would not be necessary. Ex-
emptions excuse Member States for not attaining specific results, not for not taking
the right measures. Just because of the high number of exemptions in the new water
directives, it could be stated that although there is a great deal of policy discretion
regarding goal setting for the ecological status, the qualification of water bodies, and
the mix of measures that can be taken, at the end of the day the goals and objectives
must be achieved, unless there is a justified use of the exemptions. Otherwise it will
be very difficult for other Member States in the river basin (for chemical status, for
example, downstream Member States, for ecological status also upstream Member
States) to achieve a good status in their national waters. An approach solely based
on proceduralisation will lead to an unbalanced distribution of measures that have to
be taken in the several Member States and it will result in an increased reliance on
exemptions.
However, our conclusion at this point is that we should combine both approaches
and not leave behind the valuable aspects of the older water directives with their
clear goals and standards and to use the new governance insights to improve water
management in the future. The latter seems very suitable for new problems we have to
solve like the effects of climate change on flood protection and water scarcity and the
restoration of the ecology of water systems. A minimum level of protection should,
however, be strictly protected in our point of view.
3.2 The river basin approach: individual obligations versus shared responsibility
Another new element in water management is the river basin approach. The imple-
mentation of the new water directives and the achievement of the objectives of both
directives are obligations for the Member States individually , for directives are bind-
ing as to the results to be achieved by each Member State.27 River basins, though,
often cross national or even Community borders. The river basin approach leads to
shared responsibilities between Member States within a river basin. This implies that,
as to achieving the results individually, the role of transnational cooperation becomes
more important in the whole implementation process, including goal setting, the use
of exemptions, planning and, last but not least, the taking of practical measures. The
Common Implementation Strategy of the Water Framework Directive helps the Mem-
ber States to use common concepts by implementing the Directive. Cooperation is
necessary on the international, the EC, the Member State and the regional level. This
26At least the existence of limitative exemptions is one of the reasons for the Court of Justice to con-
clude that the corresponding obligation is an obligation of results. See, for instance, Case C-337/89
Commission/United Kingdom [1992] ECR I-6103; Case C-56/90 Commission/United Kingdom [1993]
ECR I-4109; Case C-92/96 Commission/Spain [1998] ECR I-505; Case C-198/97 Commission/Germany
[1999] ECR I-3257; Case C-307/98 Commission/Belgium [2000] ECR I-3933; Case C-316/00 Commis-
sion/Ireland [2002] ECR I-10527; and Case C-272/01 Commission/Portugal [2004] ECR I-6767.
27Article 249 EC Treaty.
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will lead to closer cooperation in the future between Member States and the Com-
mission, Member States and non-Member States, between the authorities in different
policy fields, between several governmental authorities at the European, state and
regional level and, finally, between governmental authorities, non-governmental or-
ganizations, stakeholders and the public.
The WFD and the Floods Directive28 require that a river basin covering the terri-
tory of more than one Member State must be assigned to an international river basin
district. Moreover, Member States shall together ensure that the requirements of the
WFD for the achievement of the environmental objectives and in particular all pro-
grammes of measures are coordinated for the whole of the international river basin
district. For this coordination they may use existing structures stemming from inter-
national agreements, but this provision does not prohibit Member States from also
establishing new structures or concluding new agreements.29 In the case of interna-
tional river basin districts, Member States shall also ensure coordination with the
aim of producing single international river basin management plans and international
flood risk management plans.30
European water directives apparently contain obligations for Member States to co-
operate, but they do not prescribe any instruments to shape this cooperation; they only
suggest the use of existing structures stemming from international agreements.31 Nei-
ther do these directives contain any obligations to execute the programmes of mea-
sures collectively, or provisions to collectively hold Member States responsible for
the achievement of the results in an international river basin district. Nor do they pro-
vide for exemptions if Member States do not attain the required results because of cer-
tain acts or omissions by another (Member) State. Issues which cannot be dealt with
at Member State level, however, may be reported to the Commission.32 However, the
absence of cooperation (or poor cooperation) is not a good reason for an individual
Member State not to meet its obligations.33 Neither the WFD nor the Floods Direc-
tive contains any exemptions for Member States not to achieve the prescribed results
due to unsuccessful cooperation. As to the ‘good chemical status’ of surface water,
the Directive on Priority Substances34 does contain such an exemption in the case of
upstream pollution from abroad, as does the Marine Strategy Framework Directive.35
Member States can rely on these exemptions in the case of upstream pollution. Hav-
ing said that, however, relying on such an exemption would be very detrimental to the
28For the purpose of the Floods Directive Member States shall make use of the arrangements made under
Article 3 WFD.
29Article 3.4 WFD.
30Article 13.2 WFD and Article 8.2 Floods Directive.
31See AcW/CAW [2], also see AcW/CAW [1], p. 23.
32Article 12.1 WFD.
33Case C-58/89 Commission/Germany [1989] ECR I-2849.
34Directive 2008/105/EC of European Parliament and Council on environmental quality standards in the
field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC,
84/156/EEC, 84/419/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ L348/84.
35Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a
framework for Community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L164/19.




Legal qualification of general
environmental goal
Legal qualification of specific
goals
NL Order in Council (in 2009) Obligation of best effort Target values
DE On the federal (without deadline)
and Länder level
Obligation of result Intervention values (ecology
still unclear)
FR Law Obligation of result Probably intervention values
E&W No transposition Art. 4 WFD is probably
perceived as an obligation of
result
Intervention values
DK Law ? Intervention values
purposes of both the WFD and the Floods Directive. Just for that reason, a reticent
attitude should be adopted towards relying upon these exemptions.
3.3 Differences in implementation
Member States currently cooperate within river basins, but recent research in five sub-
river basins shows that there are rather great differences in the implementation of the
Water Framework Directive.36 The following sub-river basin districts were selected:
the Dommel, within the Meuse river basin district in the Netherlands; the Wensum
within the Anglia and Wensum catchment area in England; the Rur catchment area in
the Meuse river basin district within North Rhine- Westphalia in Germany; St. Brieuc
within the Loire-Brittany river basin district and its sub-basin the Baie de St Brieuc in
France; and the sub-basin Odense Fjord Basin within Jutland and Funen in Denmark.
The differences concern the way in which Member States deal with complexities and
policy discretion as well as ambitions and the legal meaning of obligations. There are
differences in implementation as far as the following aspects are concerned.
With regard to the qualification of the obligations following from the Water Frame-
work Directive it became clear that not all Members States had implemented the gen-
eral environmental objectives in their national legislation. The legal qualification of
the environmental objectives (article 4 WFD) is in all Member States an obligation
of result, except for the Netherlands (see Table 1).
There are also great differences regarding the designation of artificial and heavily
modified waters. This can be explained by the different physical and geographical
conditions in the Member States. Nevertheless, it also became clear that the attitude
towards the designation of waters differs. While in Denmark water bodies are only
designated if good status cannot be attained, the Netherlands designates most water
bodies as heavily modified or artificial based on the current status of the water bodies
(see Table 2).
Also the legal meaning of the “no deterioration” principle differs in several Mem-
ber States. Ongoing discussion on the question whether the principle should be com-
pared with the well known stand-still principle—no deterioration at all—or has a
36Uitenboogaart/Van Kempen/Wiering/Van Rijswick [26].
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Table 2
Case RBD/Country HMWB AWB Rest (Natural)
RBD Meuse (NL in total) 92% (42%) 7% (53%) 1% (4%)
RED Anglia58 54% 15% 29%
North Rhine-Westphalia > 60% together with AWBs < 40%
RED Loire-Brittany 10% 1.5% 88.5%
Denmark 10% together with AWBs 90%
Table 3
Seriousness Spatial scale Starting date Time scale Compensation
of deterioration possible?
NL Between status classes Per water body 2009 six-year period Yes
DE Within status class? Per water body 2000 ? ?
FR Between status classes Per water body 2009 six-year period ?
E&W Between status classes Per water body 2006? ? No
DK Between status classes Per water body 2009/2012 six-year period In general, no
new meaning, to be explained as no deterioration between the several status classes
leads to different results. Also differences in the time scale, the staring period and the
possibility for compensation between water bodies lead to a lack of harmonization
between the Member States (see Table 3).
The integration with other policy fields like spatial planning, nature conservation
and agriculture was also part of the research project and it became clear that all Mem-
ber States had their own method for taking care of the relationship between water
quality objectives and decision making in related policy fields. Internal integration
within water management on several governmental levels was mostly well organised
and regulated, but external integration shows major differences (see Table 4).
It became clear that agriculture was a difficult topic in all Member Sates, as well as
their contribution to the pollution concerned and the possibilities and political will to
strengthen regulation. Furthermore, most Member States only want to cooperate with
the agricultural stakeholders on a voluntary basis. There is a strong relationship be-
tween land use and water protection, which do ask for external integration to achieve
the goals of the directive.
It was difficult to discover what the actual amount of investment in water manage-
ment measures will be per Member State and how cost recovery will be organised.
That will need further research. It is not yet fully clear (because the river basin man-
agement plans and the programmes of measures were not yet definitive at the time the
research was done) what the content of the programmes of measures will be. Impor-
tant for the success of the Water Framework Directive will be the question whether
they contain mainly measures that were all ready obligatory because of older wa-
ter directives like waste water treatment and obligations following from the Nitrates
directive, or whether many new, more ecological measures will be taken.
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Table 4
Authorities in general Water authorities Non-water authorities
NL No general integration Water plans should take quality
norms into account; when
making specific decisions
authorities should take their
own plans into account
Spatial planning: consult with
water authorities and justify
any derogations (watertoets)
DE RBMPs legally binding on all
authorities
Lower authorities are bound by
the instructions of higher
authorities
No general legal instrument to
oblige other authorities to take
RBMPs into account, but
diverse legal instruments that
ascertain at least to a certain
extent policy integration
FR No general integration All decisions should be
compatible with RBMPs
Spatial plans should be
compatible with RBMPs
E&W Consideration given to both
RBMPs and supplementary
plans
Covered by general integration Covered by general integration
DK Bound by both RBMPs and
PoMs
Covered by general integration Covered by general integration
After these general remarks on the new approach in European water management,
which leads to a greater need for transnational cooperation we will further focus
on the several kinds of cooperation that are available. We start with a summary of
the possibilities for cooperation on the international level and then focus on coop-
eration on the regional transboundary level. We will finally take another look at the
previously mentioned three cases and see on what level and with which instruments
cooperation is taking place.
4 Cooperation in water management at the international level
Member States shall together ensure the coordination of the requirements of the WFD
so as to attain the environmental objectives. They may use existing structures stem-
ming from international agreements. There is a long tradition in international co-
operation between states concerning the protection and use of transboundary water-
courses. An example is the UN Water Courses Convention, containing five principles
for transboundary cooperation in water management.37 Another convention on sur-
face water which is important for the EU and its Member States is the already men-
tioned 1992 Helsinki Convention. Conventions have also been concluded concerning
the protection and use of separate watercourses, such as large rivers. These kinds of
conventions mostly aim to implement the obligations deriving from the Helsinki Con-
vention within the flowing area of a specific watercourse. Generally, the coordination
of the implementation of EC water directives also takes place within the framework
37The 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses; this
convention is not yet in force.
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of these conventions. Examples of conventions concerning watercourses that are on
EU territory are the Rhine Convention,38 the Meuse Treaty,39 and the Danube River
Protection Convention.40 Also (bilateral) treaties have been concluded concerning
multiple shared watercourses within a border region between two Member States, for
example the Albufeira Convention.41 These conventions will be briefly discussed be-
low. We will also discuss the difficulties and limits in using convention mechanisms
in transboundary interstate cooperation concerning water management.
4.1 Conventions on the protection and use of watercourses
4.1.1 The UN Water Courses Convention
As stated above, the UN Water Courses Convention lays down five principles of trans-
boundary cooperation, i.e. the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization; the
‘no harm’ principle; the general principle of cooperation; the principle of sharing
data and information; and the principle of protection and conservation of the ecosys-
tems of international water courses.42 Although the convention has not yet entered
into force, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) does apply some of these princi-
ples as they are derived from customary international law. For example, the principle
of equitable and reasonable utilization was applied in the case Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project.43 Further, the UN Water Courses Convention creates a possibility for parties
to conclude so-called ‘water course agreements’, containing agreements on the im-
plementation and interpretation of the convention relating to the protection and the
use of an international watercourse.
4.1.2 The Helsinki Convention
The Helsinki Convention entered into force on 6 October 1996. Alongside a vast
number of EU Member States and (non-member) adjacent states, also the European
38The 1999 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine; for cooperation between Germany, France, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the European Community.
39The 2003 Meuse Treaty; for cooperation between France, Luxembourg, Germany, Belgium and the
Netherlands.
40The 1994 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River;
for cooperation between Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the European Community.
41The 1998 Convention on Co-operation for Portuguese-Spanish River Basin Protection and Sustainable
Use.
42See Nollkaemper/de Villeneuve [18]; also see Gilissen [6].
43ICJ 25 September 1997, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia). Applying the principle as
customary law, the ICJ stated: “The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control
of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of
the natural resources of the Danube—with the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the
ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkoz—failed to respect the proportionality which is required by
international law.”
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Community is a party to the convention. An important aspect of the Helsinki Conven-
tion is the geographical approach, dividing watercourses into river basins. This river
basin approach is also incorporated in the European water directives mentioned.
The Helsinki Convention consists of three parts. The first part contains general
provisions which are applicable to all the parties to the convention. Among others,
the precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, the no-harm principle, the
principle of cooperation and the principle of sharing data and information have found
their way into the Helsinki Convention, and are applicable to all parties.44 The sec-
ond part contains further rules for riparian states to elaborate their cooperation. For
this purpose, the riparian state parties shall, on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or other arrangements. On the basis of
these agreements joint bodies or commissions have to be established. Several tasks
of these joint bodies are inter alia to collect, compile and evaluate data in order to
identify pollution sources which are likely to have a transboundary impact; to elabo-
rate joint monitoring programmes concerning water quality and quantity; to develop
concerted action programmes for the reduction of pollution loads from both point
sources and diffuse sources; to establish a forum for the exchange of relevant infor-
mation; and to establish warning and alarm procedures.45 Examples of agreements
concluded by virtue of the Helsinki Convention are the Rhine Convention, the Meuse
Convention and the Danube River Protection Convention.46 The third part consists of
institutional and final provisions, for example on the convening of a meeting between
the parties which shall, under normal conditions, be held every three years.
4.1.3 Conventions implementing the Helsinki Convention and/or concerning the
coordination of the implementation of the WFD
Over time, many conventions have been concluded (and repeatedly amended) con-
cerning specific transboundary watercourses. These conventions mainly tend to im-
plement the Helsinki Convention, and in a way the UN Water Course Convention.
Also the implementation of EC water directives generally takes place within the
frameworks of these conventions, although problems may arise, especially when the
EC itself or non-Member States are parties to these conventions. These conventions
have extensive similarities, but also important differences can be pointed out. As an
important similarity, these conventions all establish river protection commissions.
The success of these commissions differs, though. Other differences mostly concern
the content of the conventions and the parties thereto.
4.1.4 Rhine Convention
The 1999 Rhine Convention is probably the best-known example of a treaty on trans-
boundary cooperation between riparian states as it is widely considered to have been
44These principles also apply to non-riparian states that are parties to the convention, in order to protect
water courses from pollution from the land.
45Article 9 Helsinki Convention.
46These conventions all refer to the Helsinki Convention in their preambles.
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successful.47 The Rhine Convention has been ratified by Germany, France, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands (EU Member States), Switzerland (a non-Member State)
and the European Community. The main aims to be pursued by the parties through the
Rhine Convention are the sustainable development of the Rhine ecosystem, the pro-
duction of drinking water from the waters of the Rhine, the improvement of sediment
quality, and general flood prevention and protection.48 The convention lists a num-
ber of principles, mostly derived from the Helsinki Convention49 and the UN Water
Course Convention, by which the parties shall be guided. The core principle is the
parties’ obligation to refrain from causing significant transboundary (environmental)
damage. This principle is to be elaborated by taking measures preventing, control-
ling and reducing transboundary water pollution.50 By taking these measures, inter
alia the precautionary principle, the principle of preventive action, the polluter-pays
principle, the principle of not increasing damage, and the principle of sustainable
development have to be taken into account.51 To achieve the main aims of the con-
vention, the parties have to undertake certain actions, such as the intensification of
cooperation and the implementation of international measuring programmes.
To implement the Rhine Convention, the parties pursue their cooperation within
the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine (ICPR).52 To achieve
the aims of the convention, this commission (having legal personality) shall accom-
plish certain tasks, such as preparing international measuring programmes and studies
of the Rhine ecosystem, making proposals for individual measures and programmes
of measures, and evaluating the effectiveness of the actions and the results of the pro-
grammes of measures.53 Decisions of the ICPR shall be taken unanimously, and shall,
in principle, be implemented by the parties in accordance with their national law.
The Rhine Convention and the ICPR are not suitable for coordinating and har-
monizing the implementation of the WFD as a non-Member State and the European
Community are also parties to the convention. Therefore, an informal committee has
been established (the Rhine Coordination Committee). The bilateral informal coor-
dination of the implementation of the WFD also takes place within the Permanent
Dutch-German Border Water Commission.54
4.1.5 Meuse Treaty
The 2002 Meuse Treaty55 is another example of a treaty on transboundary coopera-
tion between riparian states. This treaty contains a regulation on cooperation between
47See Dieperink/Glasbergen [5], pp. 45–49.
48Article 3 Rhine Convention.
49Paragraph 4 of the preamble refers to the Helsinki Convention.
50See Keessen/Van Kempen/Van Rijswick [12], p. 38.
51Article 4 Rhine Convention.
52For a more thorough focus on (the work of) the ICPR: Peeters [19], pp. 210–215.
53Article 8 Rhine Convention.
54See Gilissen [6], pp. 52–53.
55This treaty was concluded at the same time and place as the 2002 Scheldt Treaty. With respect to their
content and objectives, both treaties are very similar.
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the parties concerning the entire Meuse river basin. All parties to the Meuse Treaty are
EU Member States, namely Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. The Meuse Treaty is not only meant to implement the Helsinki Convention, but
unlike the Rhine Convention it has also been concluded to create a multilateral struc-
ture for the execution of the obligations arising from the WFD, as stated in Article 4.3
of the treaty.56 The main aim of the Meuse Treaty is the sustainable and integrated
water management of the whole international Meuse river basin district, taking into
account the multiple goals of the River Meuse. Just as in the Rhine Convention, a
number of principles have been laid down in the Meuse Treaty, such as the precau-
tionary principle, the principle of preventive action, and the polluter-pays principle.
The Meuse Treaty contains fewer principles than the Rhine Convention.
Also by virtue of the Meuse Treaty an international commission has been estab-
lished to guide the implementation of this treaty. The main task of the International
Meuse Commission (IMC)57 is to advise and to recommend the parties, and to en-
courage their cooperation. Also the multilateral adjustment of the implementation of
the WFD by the individual Member States takes place within the IMC. Unfortunately,
the IMC has not yet proved as successful as the ICPR, mainly because of the absence
of the competence to establish decisive programmes of measures. The IMC also has
no competence to bind the parties to its decisions.
Alongside the Dutch-Belgian border, also informal bilateral cooperation and the
coordination of the WFD takes place within the Walloon-Dutch Water Consultation,
and within the Dutch-Flemish Integral Water Consultation.
4.1.6 Danube River Protection Convention
The last multilateral convention to be discussed here is the Danube River Protection
Convention. The parties to this convention are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and
the European Community. Except for Croatia, Moldova and the Ukraine these are
all EU Member States. The main objectives of the convention are to achieve the
goals of sustainable and equitable water management, including the conservation,
improvement and rational use of surface waters and groundwater in the international
Danube river basin district. To achieve these objectives, the parties shall cooperate on
fundamental water management issues, and they shall take all appropriate measures
to maintain and improve current environmental and water quality conditions. For
all measures aiming at the protection of the Danube river basin the precautionary
principle and the polluter-pays principle constitute a basis.
Regarding the implementation of the objectives and provisions of the convention,
the International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) has
been established. For implementing the obligations arising from the convention, the
ICPDR elaborates proposals and recommendations for the parties. The ICPDR also
carries out projects, specifying measures to be taken to achieve the objectives of the
56Also see CAW [3].
57For a more thorough focus on (the work of) the IMC: Peeters [19], pp. 203–210.
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convention (e.g. the Joint Action Programme). The coordination of the implementa-
tion of the WFD takes place on the basis of a multilevel coordination mechanism for
coordination at regional, national, bilateral and multilateral and Danube river basin
level. The ICPDR has responsibility for coordinating the cooperation and implement-
ing the WFD at the Danube river basin level.
4.1.7 Albufeira Convention
After having concluded separate regional treaties since the 18th century, in 1998 Por-
tugal and Spain concluded the Albufeira Convention containing a framework for bi-
lateral cooperation in the integrated management of the Minho, Lima, Duoro, Tejo
and Guadiana river basins. This Convention entered into force in January 2000. Al-
though, by then, the WFD was still in the development stage, the Albufeira Con-
vention was framed in accordance with the WFD, incorporating inter alia the river
basin approach.58 It also incorporates principles derived from the UN Water Courses
Convention and the Helsinki Convention, namely the principle of equitable and rea-
sonable utilization and the no-harm principle.59 The main aim of the Albufeira Con-
vention is to conduct the sustainable development of all the shared river basins by
defining a framework for bilateral cooperation.
The convention provides for two main institutions, namely the Conference of the
Parties to the Albufeira Convention (COP) and the Commission on the Application
and Development of the Convention (CADC). The COP regulates the cooperation
between Portugal and Spain at a high political level, and therefore mainly has a polit-
ical role. The COP only meets when necessary to reach consensus on transboundary
water issues between both parties to the convention.60 The CADC, which has been
especially successful since 2005, is the convention’s operational body, meeting at
least once a year61, and from 2006 onwards consisting of four Working Groups62
and one Sub-commission on public participation. A Spanish and a Portuguese del-
egation, consisting of members63 designated by each country’s central government,
compose the Commission. The CADC (through its fourth Working Group) is respon-
sible for coordinating the implementation of the WFD. Further, a proposal to establish
a Permanent Technical Secretariat was accepted by the COP at its second meeting in
February 2008. The aim is that this secretariat will start to function in 2009. Its main
function is to define methods to elaborate the river basin management plans of the
shared river basin districts.64
58See Maia [16].
59See Costa/Vergés/Barraqué [4].
60The COP has met only twice, first in July 2005 to discuss the need for increasing cooperation mech-
anisms concerning droughts and the implementation of the WFD. The second occasion was in February
2008 to establish a new (seasonal) flow regime guaranteeing minimal flows, and to approve statutory rules
of the CADC. Also see Maia [16], p. 3.
61From 2005 onwards the CACD has actually met twice a year.
62One on a flow regime, droughts and emergency situations; one on information exchange; one on the
safety of aquatic infrastructure and floods; and one on WFD issues and water quality.
63Both delegations consist of an equal number of members, with a maximum of nine.
64See Maia [16], p. 4.
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4.2 Difficulties of and limitations to cooperation at the international level
As seen above, international cooperation between states in water management of-
ten takes place by virtue of multilateral conventions. These conventions regulate the
cooperation between states by stipulating obligations for the parties, by determin-
ing principles to be taken into account in transboundary cooperation, and by estab-
lishing commissions to provide guidance in coordinating the implementation of the
conventions. But there are some difficulties and limitations to the use of multilateral
conventions.
First, these conventions are suitable for cooperation on the international level con-
cerning large rivers or large border areas. This is an important limitation to the use of
this instrument, mainly in achieving the objectives (environmental standards) of the
EC water directives. To meet these objectives in practice, the involvement of regional
water authorities in taking concrete measures is also required. These authorities can-
not cooperate on the basis of watercourse conventions. Cooperation between these
sub-national authorities concerning regional (smaller) water courses within a single
river basin is of importance as these smaller water courses occasionally also cross
borders, and often run into larger rivers affecting their water quality and quantity. So,
one should bear in mind that multilateral convention mechanisms are unsuitable for
transboundary cooperation between regional authorities, concerning smaller water
courses or specific border regions. Because watercourse conventions have their limi-
tations, we argue that these conventions are not the only instruments which should be
focused upon while giving shape to transboundary cooperation in water management.
Here again, we emphasize the importance of transboundary cooperation between re-
gional water management authorities, alongside the international cooperation at a
high political level.
Second, the mentioned watercourse conventions are sometimes less suitable as in-
struments for the implementation of obligations arising from European law. This is
especially problematic in the case of so-called mixed treaties, to which non-Member
States and the European Community are parties alongside EU Member States. These
conventions, such as the Helsinki Convention, mostly serve several purposes and do
not have the implementation of European law as one of their objectives.65 Keessen
et al. state that treaties concluded with respect to specific rivers would be more ap-
propriate for the implementation of obligations regarding cooperation arising from
European water directives.66 That might be true when only Member States are par-
ties to the convention (for example, in the case of the Meuse Treaty), but this might
still be problematic when non-Member States and/or the European Community are
parties to the convention (for example, the Rhine Convention and the Danube River
Protection Convention). As we have seen, cooperation (i.e. the coordination of the
implementation) in the latter case mostly takes place on an informal basis, if need be
within the framework of the relevant convention and/or coordinated by a commission
or committee.
65See Hey/Van Rijswick [10].
66See Keessen/Van Kempen/Van Rijswick [12], p. 38.
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5 Cooperation in water management at the regional transboundary level
As stated above, the international level is not the only level on which transbound-
ary cooperation in water management should take place. In achieving the purposes
of the European water directives, also at the regional level transboundary cooper-
ation is required, not only because a substantial part of the water in large rivers
comes from smaller (transboundary) watercourses, but also because these smaller
water courses are themselves part of the river basins. In accordance with the Pream-
ble to the WFD the success of the directive relies on close cooperation and coherent
action at Community, Member State and regional levels.67 Recently, the conscious
need for transboundary cooperation in water management, especially at the regional
level, has impressively increased. For example, in the Netherlands the year 2009 has
been proclaimed as ‘the year of transboundary cooperation in water management’.
Multilateral convention instruments, as described above, are less suitable for trans-
boundary cooperation between regional water authorities. This emphasizes the need
for other cooperation mechanisms.
In this section we discuss the cooperation concerning water management at the re-
gional level. We will first make some general remarks on the cooperation at this level.
Thereafter, we will describe several instruments for regional transboundary coopera-
tion, which could be used by water managers. To give examples of the possibilities,
we will focus on several instruments for cooperation between Dutch water managers
and their Flemish/Walloon and German counterparts in border regions. The general
aspects of these forms of cooperation (mostly based on the 1980 Madrid Conven-
tion) could be mutatis mutandis applicable to other border regions. An instrument to
which we devote special attention is the European Grouping on Territorial Coopera-
tion based on the recently adopted EGTC Regulation.
5.1 General remarks on regional transboundary cooperation
Cooperation and transboundary contacts between decentralized government bodies
are not a typically 21st century matter. In fact, these bodies have been cooperating
since national borders were first demarcated and they have played an important role
in the development of transboundary cooperation structures. Especially shortly after
the Second World War prominent persons from border regions contacted each other,
at first leading to informal cooperation, but later to more intense and formal forms
of cooperation. One of the first structural forms of transboundary cooperation in Eu-
rope was the EUREGIO (in the Dutch-German border region). This form of coopera-
tion has been an example to many transboundary contacts across Europe, later being
called Euregions (after this first and successful cooperation structure). At the begin-
ning, Euregions were informal organizations with a slightly idealistic initial concept,
but as the conscious need for transboundary cooperation grew, these organizations
became more formalized, and most were granted a private legal status. After con-
cluding the 1980 Madrid Convention68 and bilateral or trilateral conventions based
67Paragraph 14 Preamble WFD.
68European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Au-
thorities, signed in Madrid on 21 May 1980.
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on the Madrid Convention were also concluded, the Euregions could even be given a
public legal status, and some Euregions made use of this possibility.69
The 1980 Madrid Convention obliges the parties to make their best efforts to estab-
lish further agreements concerning transboundary cooperation between territorial (i.e.
decentralized) communities or authorities.70 For example, both the Benelux Agree-
ment (BA) and the Anholt Agreement (AA) derive from the Madrid Convention. By
virtue of the BA, Dutch, Flemish, Walloon and Luxembourg decentralized authori-
ties can form transboundary cooperation structures (see below). By virtue of the AA,
Dutch and German authorities can do the same, but Dutch district water boards do not
fall under the scope of this agreement. Therefore, we will not pay any further atten-
tion to this agreement below.71 Dutch and German water managers can cooperate on
the basis of the Dutch-German Border Convention, which will be discussed below.
There is at least one complicating factor in transboundary cooperation between
EU Member States water management authorities at the regional level. On the basis
of the WFD, Member States shall ensure that a river basin covering the territory of
more than one Member State is assigned to an international river basin district. In
that case each Member State shall individually ensure the appropriate administrative
arrangements, including the identification of the appropriate competent authority, for
applying the rules of the directives within the portion of any international river basin
district within its territory.72 The WFD does not contain any further rules on the in-
dication of appropriate competent authorities. Therefore, Member States have a great
deal of discretion when indicating such authorities, which has led to very diverse
administrative arrangements and a highly incompatible division of competences be-
tween administrative bodies in border regions across Europe. For example, Dutch
water management competences are allocated to the central government and to dis-
trict water boards at the regional level.73 German water management competences
are to be found at the federal level, as well as at the so-called Wasserbehörde of
general governmental bodies at the Land, regional and local levels.74 In Belgium wa-
ter management competences are mostly divided between the ‘gewesten’ (regions or
districts), the provinces and the municipalities.75 These differences in the division
of competences—not only in the Dutch border region—are a complicating factor in
transboundary cooperation at the regional level, alongside possible cultural and lin-
guistic differences.
69For the development of Euregions over time see Uijen [25].
70For a further analysis of the Madrid Convention see Hertoghs/Hoetjes [9].
71We think that Dutch district water boards should be able to cooperate by virtue of the Anholt Agreement,
mainly because water policy is nowadays becoming more integrated in (general) environmental policy. The
fact that in the Netherlands regional water management is (mainly) a task for functionally decentralized
authorities provides no reason to exclude these authorities from cooperating by virtue of general cooper-
ation mechanisms such as the Anholt Agreement. Dutch district water boards are also not excluded from
cooperating by virtue of the Benelux Agreement.
72Article 3.3 WFD.
73See Reinhard/Folmer [20].
74More comprehensively Solf [24].
75See Maes/Lavrysen [15].
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5.2 Regional transboundary cooperation between Dutch and German water
managers
In 1960 the Dutch-German Border Convention was concluded. Concerning trans-
boundary water management, Chap. 4 of this convention is of importance. As stated
above, in 1963 the Permanent Dutch-German Border Water Commission (PBWC)
was established to—for the benefit of cooperation in good neighbourliness—shape
an interstate consultation and cooperation framework for water-related issues with
respect to border waters.76 The PBWC only consists of State government represen-
tatives; no delegates from decentralized authorities have a seat in this commission.
Seven sub-commissions assist the PBWC. Each transboundary river basin is rep-
resented by a sub-commission, in which also delegates of the competent regional
water management authorities on both sides of the border are represented. These
sub-commissions have the same tasks and competences as the PBWC, except for
receiving and dealing with notices of objection.
These competent water management authorities (just as the central governments)
also have the possibility to conclude so-called special agreements with their foreign
counterparts concerning the distinctive border waters under their regime.77 It remains
unclear whether these agreements have the status of public international law agree-
ments or agreements under national (private or public) law.78 We think that these
agreements have a national law character as no state actors are (directly) party to
them. It depends on the merits of the agreement whether the agreements are of a
private or public law nature. Agreements only containing settlements on the main-
tenance of border waters (or the defrayment thereof) will be of a private law na-
ture (maintenance agreements). Agreements concluding settlements on the exercise
of administrative competences can be seen as of a public law nature (competence
agreements). In practice, only agreements of the first type have been concluded. Fur-
thermore, it seems that after 1994 no use has been made of the possibility to conclude
special agreements.
It also has to be mentioned that the PBWC and the sub-commissions functioned
quite well until the entry into force of the WFD. Thereafter, the PBWC and the sub-
commissions no longer seem to function that well. A reason for this could be an
organizational disagreement between the Netherlands and Germany on the use of
these networks for coordinating the implementation of the WFD.79 From 2002 on-
wards, the transboundary coordination of river basin management plans has (quite
successfully) taken place within the so-called Steuerungsgruppe and several working
groups. The aim is to intensify and eventually formalize this form of cooperation.
Within this formal framework (to be), more structural regional transboundary coop-
eration could be given shape. It is still uncertain which construction of transboundary
76Articles 57 jo. 64 Border Convention.
77Article 59.2 Border Convention.
78See Heemskerk [7], pp. 182–183; also see Seerden [22], p. 224.
79The Netherlands wanted the tasks of the PBWC network to be enhanced with the competence to deal
with transboundary WFD issues. Germany did not agree to that. See AcW/CAW [1], p. 10.
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cooperation is to be chosen. We think that the Anholt Agreement is as a possibil-
ity (only if the Dutch regional water boards can be brought under the scope of that
agreement). Another option is cooperation under the EGTC Regulation. We expect
that both possibilities will eventually lead to the annulment of the old cooperation
mechanism under the Dutch-German Border Convention.
5.3 Regional transboundary cooperation between Dutch and Belgian water
managers
As mentioned above, the 1980 Madrid Convention encouraged its parties to enter into
further agreements concerning transboundary cooperation between territorial com-
munities or authorities. With regard to this convention, in 1986 the Netherlands, Bel-
gium and Luxembourg concluded the trilateral Benelux Agreement on transboundary
cooperation between territorial communities and authorities (BA).80 For this section,
we focus on the cooperation between Dutch and Flemish (water management) au-
thorities under the BA. Where comparable (bilateral or trilateral) agreements have
been concluded elsewhere in Europe, the text below is mutatis mutandis applicable,
unless regulated otherwise, of course.
The BA provides a default system for Dutch and Flemish authorities to establish
transboundary cooperation structures. The authorities which are competent to estab-
lish these structures are Dutch provinces, municipalities, district water boards and
joint public bodies, and Flemish provinces, municipalities, so-called polders and wa-
teringen (polders and watercourses), associations of municipalities and public cen-
tres for social well-being. In the Netherlands it is mainly the district water boards
that have been given competences concerning water management. In Flanders water
management competences are to be found at different administrative levels (mainly
provinces, municipalities, and polders and watercourses). So, to establish a well-
functioning structure for transboundary cooperation all these authorities have to be
involved.
The BA provides for the establishment of three different transboundary coopera-
tion structures, namely the administrative settlement, the common organ, or the trans-
boundary public body. Cooperating authorities can freely chose between these struc-
tures. The administrative settlement is often regarded as the most effortless form of
cooperation under the BA. This could be proven wrong as the administrative settle-
ment indeed does not intend to establish an umbrella organ or body, but can definitely
impose legally enforceable obligations on the parties. Administrative settlements gen-
erally contain agreements on the reciprocal exercise of certain administrative compe-
tences, such as licensing competences. Therefore, the administrative settlements are
to be seen as competence agreements under national public law. It also seems possible
to conclude agreements on the (defrayment of) maintenance of border waters. This
kind of administrative settlement is a maintenance agreement under national private
law.
80Trb. 1986, 160; in force on 1 April 1991. Recently on the possibilities for water managers to cooperate
under the BA: Gilissen [6], pp. 76–84.
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Another form of cooperation based on the BA is the establishment of a common
organ. A common organ is to be seen as a formal consultation structure without any
legal personality. There is some uncertainty concerning to what extent autonomous
competences can be assigned to a common organ,81 but certainly no competences can
be assigned by which a common organ can make decisions which are legally binding
for citizens, such as decisions concerning the assessment of taxes or the establishment
of ordinances.82 The cooperating authorities, if they so wish, can assign competences
to a common organ by which it can make decisions which are legally binding on
them.83 Above all, the establishment of a common organ provides for the founding
of a consultation forum without legal personality, on the basis of which cooperating
authorities can meet to intensify their contacts and cooperation.84
The last and most thorough form of transboundary cooperation is the establish-
ment of an autonomous public body. A public body has full legal personality, and
the cooperating authorities can choose to assign administrative and regulative com-
petences to it. If so, the public body is competent to make decisions which are legally
binding for citizens.85 Legal relationships between the public body and their legal
subordinates (natural or legal personalities) are regulated by the national law of the
state (Dutch or Belgian law) on whose territory the public body exercises its compe-
tences. The legal relationship between the public body and its employees, in principle,
is regulated by the national law of the state where the public body has its registered
office.
The BA provides a good framework to establish formal transboundary coopera-
tion structures between Dutch and Flemish water management authorities. In prac-
tice, nevertheless, no cooperation structures have yet been established by water man-
agers on the basis of the BA. Cooperation structures have been established between
Dutch and Flemish provinces and between Dutch and Flemish municipalities, but
the Dutch district water boards do not seem to be involved in this kind of formal
cooperation. A reason for this might be that water management competences in Flan-
ders have mostly been assigned to general public authorities (provinces and munici-
palities), whereas the Dutch water management competences have been assigned to
the functionally decentralized water boards, which have no direct counterpart across
the border. Dutch district water boards generally express the desire to formalize co-
operation with Flemish water management authorities, especially because informal
regional cooperation structures (such as the transboundary river basin committees
under the umbrella of the Dutch-Flanders Integral Water Consultation) do not work
successfully.86
81Mostly because the BA does not contain an elaboration of this cooperation structure.
82See Seerden [22], p. 155.
83Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken [17], p. 18.
84See Hertoghs [8], p. 112.
85See Seerden [23], p. 128.
86See Gilissen [6], p. 85.
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5.4 Regional transboundary cooperation between water managers on the basis of
the EGTC Regulation
In this article, special attention is paid to the Regulation on a European Grouping
of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC Regulation)87 as this regulation provides not only
for a new form of transboundary cooperation, but it is, in contrast with for exam-
ple the Border Convention and the BA, also generally applicable in European border
regions.88 The preamble to the regulation states that measures are necessary to re-
duce the significant difficulties encountered by Member States and, in particular, by
regional and local authorities in implementing and managing actions of territorial co-
operation within the framework of differing national laws and procedures.89 In order
to overcome these difficulties, it is necessary to institute a cooperation instrument at
Community level for the optional creation of cooperative groupings with legal per-
sonality and extensive legal capacity.90 For this objective, the regulation provides for
the establishment of an EGTC by Member States, regional authorities, local authori-
ties and/or other bodies governed by public law91 for the purpose of facilitating and
promoting cross-border, transnational and/or interregional cooperation (i.e. territor-
ial cooperation), with the exclusive aim of strengthening economic and social co-
hesion.92 The possibility to establish an EGTC is additional to the opportunities and
frameworks provided by the acquis of the Council of Europe93, within which regional
and local authorities can cooperate across borders. The EGTC instrument is explic-
itly not intended to circumvent those frameworks or to provide a set of common rules,
which would uniformly govern all such arrangements throughout the Community.94
An EGTC should, therefore, be able to act, either for the purpose of implementing
territorial cooperation programmes or projects co-financed by the Community, or for
the purpose of carrying out actions of territorial cooperation initiated by the Member
States and/or their regional and local authorities,95 although an EGTC could never
obtain competences exercised by regional and local authorities as public bodies, such
as policing and regulatory competences.96
87Regulation No. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on a European
grouping of territorial cooperation (EGTC), OJ L 210/19. This regulation entered into force on 1 August
2007.
88Recently on the possibilities for water managers to cooperate under the EGTC Regulation: Gilissen [6].
89Paragraph 2 Preamble EGTC Regulation.
90Paragraphs 8 and 9 Preamble EGTC Regulation.
91Where the legislation of a third country or agreements between Member States and third countries so
allow, the EGTC Regulation does not exclude the possibility of entities from third countries participating
in an EGTC (Paragraph 16 Preamble EGTC Regulation). An EGTC, though, should always be made up of
members located on the territory of at least two Member States (Article 3.2 EGTC Regulation).
92Articles 1.2 and 3.1 EGTC Regulation.
93Mainly the 1980 Madrid Convention and the bilateral or trilateral agreements based on that convention
are meant here.
94Paragraph 5 Preamble EGTC Regulation.
95Paragraph 11 Preamble EGTC Regulation.
96Paragraph 13 Preamble EGTC Regulation.
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When we compare the several instruments for regional transboundary coopera-
tion, given their possibilities for parties to regulate the subject of cooperation, the
possibility to create an organization with legal personality and the competences that
can be given within the several forms of cooperation, we can provide the following
overview (see Table 5).
This overview shows the attractive possibilities of the EGTC. Member States as
well as regional and local authorities can be members of an EGTC. Therefore, also
(public) water management authorities can be members of such a cooperation struc-
ture. An EGTC has, in order to fulfill its tasks, legal personality and in each Member
State the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under that state’s
national law. In particular, it may acquire or dispose of movable and immovable
property and employ staff, and may be a party to legal proceedings.97 An EGTC
at least consists of an assembly, which is made up of representatives of its members,
and of a director, who represents the EGTC and acts on its behalf. The statutes may
provide for additional organs with clearly defined competences.98 These organs can
97Articles 1.3 and 1.4 EGTC Regulation.
98Article 10 EGTC Regulation.
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have general competences concerning the EGTC, but they can also have more specific
competences, for example concerning water or spatial planning issues.99
The establishment of an EGTC is optional for the authorities wishing to cooperate.
The decision to establish an EGTC takes place at the initiative of its prospective mem-
bers, which will each notify the Member State under whose law it has been formed
of its intentions to participate in the EGTC. They also have to send that Member
State a copy of the proposed convention and statutes by which the EGTC shall be
governed. Thereafter, the Member State concerned shall, in principle,100 approve the
prospective member’s participation in the EGTC within three months.101
After approval by the Member State concerned, the members of the EGTC shall
unanimously agree on the convention and the statutes, ensuring consistency with the
approval. The EGTC itself is governed by this convention, on the basis of which the
statutes for internal regulation (such as decision-making procedures, the working lan-
guage, functioning arrangements, et cetera) shall be adopted.102 The convention inter
alia specifies the name of the EGTC, a list of the EGTC’s members, the extent of the
territory on which it may execute its tasks, and the law applicable to the interpreta-
tion and enforcement of the convention (which is the law of the Member State where
the EGTC has its registered office). It also specifies the specific objectives and tasks
of the EGTC. These objectives and tasks could be of a general nature, but an EGTC
could also have a more specific composition of objectives and tasks, for example
concerning transboundary cooperation within the policy field of water management.
As to the objectives and tasks specified by the convention, the following can be
said. An EGTC shall carry out the tasks given to it by its members in accordance with
the regulation. The members can only assign tasks to an EGTC which fall within their
competences under national law. The EGTC shall act within the confines of the tasks
given to it, which shall be limited to the facilitation and promotion of territorial co-
operation to strengthen economic and social cohesion. Specifically, these tasks shall
be limited primarily to the implementation of territorial cooperation programmes or
projects co-financed by the Community through specific European funding mecha-
nisms, but an EGTC may also carry out other specific actions of territorial coopera-
tion by its members. It is most important that the tasks given to an EGTC shall not
concern the exercise of competences conferred by public law or of duties whose ob-
ject is to safeguard the general interest of states or of other public authorities, such
as policing or regulatory competences, justice and foreign policy.103 The exercise
of public competences explicitly remains a task for the members of the EGTC. The
EGTC, therefore, is a suitable cooperation structure to determine joint (or coordi-
99See Gilissen [6], pp. 94–96.
100The Member State concerned shall approve the participation, unless it considers that such participation
is not in conformity with the EGTC Regulation or national law, including the prospective member’s com-
petences and duties, or that such participation is not justified for reasons of public interest or of the public
policy of that Member State.
101Article 4 EGTC Regulation.
102Articles 8 and 9 EGTC Regulation.
103Article 7 EGTC Regulation.
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nated) policy on certain issues (such as water management) and to jointly implement
this policy by way of executing operational tasks together.104
In accordance with the above, and to fulfill its task properly, an EGTC has legal
personality and the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under the
national law of the Member State where it exercises its competences. This legal per-
sonality and legal capacity in particular concern (private) law acts, such as acquiring
or disposing of movable or immovable property, employing staff, or being a party to
legal proceedings.
In practice, no EGTCs have yet been established by EU Member State water man-
agement authorities. That may be because the instrument is relatively in its infancy
and unknown, but also because water managers may think that this form of coop-
eration is too intense and too formal. For example, the Dutch district water board
De Dommel expressed its wish to cooperate with its Flemish counterparts on the
basis of the EGTC Regulation, but this intention failed because the Flemish authori-
ties preferred to cooperate on a less formal basis. In contrast, we think that the EGTC
Regulation should be given a chance, especially in transboundary water management,
as its general applicability throughout Europe might lead to a more coherent way of
and more transparency in transboundary water management within the EU. We do
not consider this form of cooperation to be too intense and too formal as no pub-
lic competences will be assigned to the EGTC (these will remain with the members
themselves) and an EGTC is (just) an instrument to jointly implement policy.
6 Conclusions
With the adoption of the Water Framework Directive, new approaches have found
their way into modern EC water law. A major new approach in EC water law is the
river basin approach, dividing water flows into geographically allocated river basins.
This approach does justice to the flowing and uncontained character of water, but
also lies at the heart of one of the major challenges in water management for the
EC and especially for its Member States. In theory, the problem can be captured in
a few words: the objectives of the EC water directives have to be met by the Mem-
ber States individually, while the river basin approach leads to shared responsibilities
between Member States within a river basin. Or even more succinctly: to meet their
own obligations, Member States should cooperate. In practice, though, transbound-
ary cooperation often seems problematic. The main problem with transnational co-
operation is the fact that Member States have different systems and governmental
responsibilities for water management. In some Member States water management
is part of environmental management, in other Member States it is a separate policy
field. Moreover, competent authorities can be found for aspects of water management
on the central level, the federal level, the regional level like provinces and the local
level like municipalities. For example, in France and the Netherlands there are spe-
cific water authorities. In other Member States water management is not dealt with
by the government alone, but also by agencies or private organizations.
104See Van Rijswick [27], pp. 99–100.
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Cooperation in transboundary water management should take place on both the
international and the regional level. The former level is mostly suitable for inter alia
the coordination of the implementation of EC water directives and the coordination
of river basin management plans and programmes of measures. The latter is better
suited to executing water policy in practice. Cooperation at state level mostly takes
place within the setting of Treaties. There are less legal problems when only Member
States are parties. Arrangements can be more far-reaching and include water quality,
water quantity, flood protection, protection of the marine environment and so on.
Cooperation at a regional level mostly takes place in an informal way because of
a hesitation to use binding legal arrangements, because of differences in the organi-
zation of water management within the Member States, the way Member States deal
with complexity and policy discretion and perhaps also because of a different sense
of urgency and differences in culture. Also the ambitions to meet objectives deriving
from these directives differ among Member States, as do the ways in which these
states consider the legal value of obligations. Eliminating, minimizing or at least mu-
tually understanding these differences should be the starting point for Member States
wishing to cooperate successfully.
A really new approach would be to hold all Member States that together share a
river basin district responsible for achieving the goals and objectives. That would—
at least in our opinion—lead to closer cooperation and to a restricted use of exemp-
tions. We expect that in the end the goals and objectives of the new water directives
will be attained somewhat earlier, because there is also a shared sense of urgency.
Furthermore, it is a more logical approach, which fits better in transnational river
basin management. The problem is, of course, that EC environmental law uses direc-
tives with obligations for Member States individually. Putting forward these changes
would mean a revision of the EC Treaty and many water directives. However, the idea
deserves further investigation.
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